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I gratefuffy acknowledge the help of Charles Jencks, without who 's guidance and support this paper would never have happened. 
Leaders of the Modem Movement in architecture typically have 
been portrayed as standing above politics and in opposition to 
reactionary social movements such as Fascism. But over the last 
thirty years it has become apparent that this picture of moral probity 
is far from clear. The Modemists, perhaps because of a pragmatic 
outlook, and a philosophical view that stresses success , 
functionalism and power, have more often than is thought, 
collaborated with repressive regimes. Their record is not as pure 
as their defenders would like. As the complicated case of the 
Quantum physicist Werner Heisenberg has recently revealed , 
collaboration of a top professional with the Nazi hierarchy has many 
benign motives as weil as negative consequences. 
This paper will explore the moral ambiguities of one Modemist 
leader, Mies van der Rohe, to become a, perhaps the, architect of 
Germany (Fig. 1 ). My intention is not to censure, but to elucidate the 
moral ambiguities of his position ; it is more typical of architects' 
relations to the power structure than most apologists of the Modern 
Movement would like to admit. 
Mies van der Rohe was one ot the most central figures of the 
Modem Movement. In 1924, he became chairman and director of 
the architectural exhibitions for the Novembergruppe, the main 
outlet of the avant-garde in Berlin. This was in addition to being one 
of the founding members of the Ring, the elite cell of Berlin 
architects that helped to establish the postwar Modem Movement. 
In the 1930's, members of the Modem Movement were traditionally 
opposed Fascism, and a majority fled from Germany and ltaly to 
England, America and elsewhere. This self-imposed exile is called 
the „diaspora" of the Modem Movement, and has generated a myth 
associating modernism with organized political resistance. However, 
the individual behavior of those considered to be „archetypal 
modernists" often complied with the power structure: Walter Gropius 
wrote letters to Goebbels justifying modern architecture as Germ an 
and entered the Reichsbank competition , Le Corbusier worked 
under the Vichy government, Giuseppe Terragni worked und er the 
ltalian Fascists, and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe accommodated the 
Nazis and sought their approval. Contrary to usual opinion, this 
paper will contend that Mies' behavior was typical of other grand 
modern architects. 
The premise of most buildings of the Modem Movement was, as 
described by Mary McLeod, ... "to serve as an agent of social 
redemption by implementing the measures of economy, efficiency, 
and technical innovation as weil as being able to produce buildings 
cheaply, make them available to all, and thus improve social 
conditions."1 Although Mies was interested in projects with a social 
agenda, as seen in his participation in the housing development at 
the Weissenhof Exhibition, his primary intent was to define cultural 
reform in terms of aesthetic and spiritual ideals rather than material 
and social matters. As opposed to what most critics have written, 
Mies dismissed the implications of social reform built into the old 
doctrine of the pre-war Werkbund expectations. 
Given these goals and knowing Mies' uncompromising character, 
11 seems surprising that Mies was asked to become director of the 
Bauhaus in Dessau, in 1930. The Bauhaus was founded as an 
alternative institution underthe strong influence of Russian socialist 
Ideals - ideals that didn't necessarily coincide with Mies' more 
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liberal and capitalist beliefs. In fact , Mies' career at the Bauhaus 
was short-lived. When Mies was asked by Walter Gropius to 
assume the directorship in Dessau, the Bauhaus' existence was 
already on shaky grounds due to political and financial problems. 
By 1930, the ideological differences between the emerging Natio-
nal-Socialist Party and the Bauhaus' implicitly socialist ideals were 
firmly established. On October 1, 1932, the Bauhaus in Dessau 
was shut down due to funding cuts by the city council - cuts which 
were motivated by the council 's fear of the Social Democrats. 
In order to fulfill Mies' goal of re-opening the Bauhaus as a private 
institution in Berlin, the city of Dessau turned the rights on all 
patents, the equipment and trademark (the right to use the name 
„Bauhaus") over to Mies. He became the official „owner" of the 
Bauhaus and was able to treat any dispute as his private affair. In 
late October, the Bauhaus in Berlin opened, but it lasted less than 
a year. lncreasing political pressure from the Nazis gradually made 
the Bauhaus untenable, and it was closed in August of 1933 (Fig.2). 
Mies attempted to negotiate a re-opening of the Bauhaus with 
Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Office for the Supervision of the 
ldeological Training and Education of the National-Socialist Party 
and with the Gestapo. 
The Nazis agreed to re-open the Bauhaus under certain conditions, 
notably the dismissal of two faculty members and close friends of 
Mies, Wassily Kandinsky and Ludwig Karl Hilberseimer. Surprisingly, 
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3auhaus Dessau, Prellerhaus mit Hakenkreuz 
'ahne 
Neihnachten 1933 
2 Bauhaus Dessau, Prellerhaus with swastika 
flag 
After the closure ol the Bauhaus, the swastika 
!lag signified the victory of the National-
Socialists over the architecture of the Modern 
Movement 
records show that one day after the Nazis agreed to permit 
Bauhaus to continue operating, Mies ordered the dissolution of the 
school. lt is possible that Mies' letter and the letter from the Nazis' 
crossed in the mail.2 
On the 1 Oth of August, in a note to his students, Mies declared that 
if the Bauhaus had been financially viable, he would have agreed 
to the requirements set by the Nazis, ( e .g. the dismissal of Kandinsky 
and Hilberseimer). Mies' effort to communicate with the Nazis must 
be interpreted as an effort to compromise with them. In retrospect, 
it appears that Mies had a policy in making overtures to the Nazis, 
demonstrating his willingness to toe the line and closethe Bauhaus. 
To our knowledge, this was the first time that Mies compromised his 
ideals, and did so in orderto get commissions. lt seems as if the fate 
of the Bauhaus was an indicator of the fate of the Modem Movement 
within the framework of the Third Reich. lf the Bauhaus had 
endured the political pressure by the Nazis, Mies would have been 
able to demonstrate the appropriateness of defining modern 
architecture as „German", and he would have succeeded in 
becoming a modern architect in Nazi Germany. 
Even though Mies was willing to compromise, in 1933, he lost the 
first major public competition of the newly founded Nazi Germany, 
the design of the Reichsbank, Imperial Bank, in Berlin. Mies was 
invited by the board of the Reichsbank, along with Walther Gropius 
and others, to participate. Mies was selected as one of the winning 
finalists. His ten-story block with a massive, unornamented convex 
facade stood out not only because of its symmetrical layout and 
simple profile, but also because of its inherent monumentality 
(Fig.3-5). Mies' grandiose project recalled the architecture of the 
Kaiserreich and has to be considered as un-modern in its 
compositional formality, although the materials and severity of 
expression were both modern and reduced classical. 
During this period, Adolf Hitler's architectural intentions were 
beginning to show more clearly. Hitler was personally involved in 
the judgment of the Reichsbank competition entries. He rejected 
all designs because the buildings lacked, as the chancellor stated, 
the „grandiosity and impressiveness Hitler deemed essential forthe 
buildings of the state, and complained they looked like normal office 
3 Perspective sketch ol Mies' Reichsbank Competition Proposal, Canal 
Elevation, 1933 
The symmetrical, monumental wings of the facade are an expression 
of an architecture of power, which became the architectural expression 
of Mies' work in the U.S. 
f 
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buildings." Mies' design was the only entry that satisfied what Philip 4 Plan ot Reichsbank, top tloor 
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Johnson called at the time Hitler's 'craving for monumentality'. 
According to Elaine Hochman, Mies was disappointed that the 
German leader decided to return one of the most heroic architectural 
competitions to the bank's own technical design division.3 
In 1934, Mies was desperate for work and took the opportunity 
given by the Nazis to design the exhibition hall for the German 
People/German Labor exhibition to be held in Berlin from April to 
June of that year. (Fig. 6). The stated purpose of the exhibition, 
described by Richard Pommer was ... "to display the Nationalist 
Socialist doctrines of race and labor in Germany. As a whole, the 
main goal of the exhibition was to warn the Germ ans of the dangers 
of racial degeneracy, a display of the countermeasures of the 
regime. "4 The architectural expression of the exhibition hall was 
reminiscent of Mies' earlier buildings such as the Brick Country 
House of 1924. Compared to Mies' previous works, the only visible 
difference was the more symmetrical layout of the plan. Throughout 
the 1930's, Mies' architecture became increasingly more stern and 
reduced. This monumentality continued in his American works. 
In 1935, Mies rejected the execution of a hause commission for 
Ulrich Lange and his family because the Baupolizei (police in 
charge of supervising design and building construction) wanted the 
construction of an earthen wall to hide the hause from the street 
(Fig. 7). Otherwise, the hause would have been built exactly as 
designed by Mies. The langes saw the restriction as a mere face-
saving device by the council. Not so in the eyes of Mies, who was 
unwilling to compromise his design - the pure platonic aesthetic 
would not be sullied by an earthen wall. Surprisingly, in this case, 
his commitment to pure form took precedence over his will to 
succeed. Formal integrity gave him a moment of moral integrity. 
After, in effect, refusing the compromise on the Lange hause, Mies 
focused on the design for the new German Exposition Building for 
the 1935 Brussels World Fair- a highly politicized project. Mies was 
invited by the president of the Reichskammer der Bildenden 
Kuenste (an organization under Heinrich Goebbel's Ministry of 
Propaganda) to participate. Mies' expectations were high. He 
hoped to continue the earlier success of his Barcelona Pavilion on 
a more monumental scale, and even more importantly to represent 
the new German Reich in Brussels. 
Very little artistic freedom was given in the guidelines for the 1935 
Brussels World Fairwhich was written by the Reich's Commissioner 
on the 14th of May, 1934. As was stated in the first sentence of the 
document, the German Pavilion was to "proceed from the principle 
of totality inherent in the Third Reich . ..s The notion of totality was 
new to German politics, but eventually became the essence of the 
Third Reich politically as weil as architecturally. 
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6 Mining Exhibit, Deutsches Volk/Deutsche Arbeit Exhibition 
The document gave the architect an in-depth understanding of the 
program, „an explanation of the ideological reasoning, and the 
implementation of materials appropriate for representing the Nazi 
ideology (for example: colored glass for the representation of the 
German tribes)."6 The plan for the exhibition called for a hall of 
honor for Goebbel's Propaganda Ministry and four major exhibits in 
addition to the industrial exhibits. The exhibit titled Weltanschau-
ung, or „world view", Hitler's phrase forfundamental Nazi principles, 
was to include the functions and goals of the Reichskulturkammer, 
Goebbel's bureau for the control of the arts. The exhibition about 
people was to range from the Nazi Party, the storm troopers, and 
the Deutsche Arbeitsfront and its Kraft durch Freude ("strength 
through pleasure") organization to youth and the school, crafts and 
the middle class, and the landscape. Another section was to be 
called „Peasant and Soil" (Bauer und Boden) , a variant of the 
slogan of Nazi racism and expansionism "Blood and Soil" (Blut und 
Boden) , because the latter was deemed „not feasible in Brussels." 
A fourth exhibition was to deal with new transportation proposals. "7 
The major goal of the exhibition, as described in the program, was 
to express the will of National-Socialist Germany through an 
imposing form: the building was to symbolize the fighting strength 
and heroic will of National-Socialism. 
Mies' competition entry (drawings and a model) was accompanied 
by a letter to the Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment for the 
People, dated July 3, 1934, which explained his design ideology 
and strategy. In a very general first sentence, Mies described his 
basic design ideas as follows: 
. During the last years, Germany has developed a form (Form) for 
its expositions that more and more shuns away from /arge expanses 
and progresses from exterior embellishment to the essential, to 
what an exposition should be, to a factual (sachlich) but effective 
visual display of things, to a real picture of German achievements".8 
In general, Mies' design followed his earlier guidelines: .less is 
more" and "form follows function." His aesthetic approach closely 
followed his personal design philosophy. Yet, Mies continued in the 
letter to call his ideology "Superior to any other" and stated that the 
„clear and striking language" would have corresponded to the 
"essence of Germ an work." He insisted thatthe "effects of this (his) 
language, including those (effects) it has upon foreign countries, 
have been demonstrated (in his designs) in the course of the last 
years." Mies was probably referring to the Barcelona Pavilion. 
Clearly, the programmatic requirements dictated the display of 
swastikas and the German Eagle as an integral part of the design, 
and Mies adhered to them (Fig.8). In Mies' design, two marble walls 
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8 German Pavilion Project, Sketch of the central portion of the lacade, 
1934, with a German Eagle marking the main entrance and two Nazi 
flags framing the front elevation. 
10 Sheet of sketches for the German Pavilion 
(swastika rendered on perspective) 
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7 Elevation of the Ulrich Lange House Project, 
Krefeld, 1935 
9 lnteriorperspective of Hall of Honor, German Pavilion, with the inscription 
„Deutsches Reich" on a partition wall 
became a billboard for Nazi ideology: a large swastika was carved 
into one, Deutsches Reich was inscribed in another (Fig.9). A 
bronze eagle of the Reich stood at the far end of the court. 
Mies sketched a variety of swastikas, from the very literal to the very 
abstract. A literal swastika sketched onto one elevation expressed 
Mies' willingness to utilize, in the mostdirect and blunt manner, Nazi 
symbols within his own language of architecture (Fig.10). One can 
assume that to Mies, the symbols became ornamental details. This 
contradicted Mies' „less is more" philosophy. A quote by Elaine 
Hochman further illustrated Mies' opinion on the use of Nazi 
symbols (from a discussion on a Textile Exhibition sponsored by the 
Nazis) : 
„ There is nothing ... absolutely nothing ... in the show to which the 
Nazis could possibly object. At the veiy worst, they might forbid the 
use of my name, as they did in thirty-four. And that bothers me now 
as much as it did then! Perhaps we might put in a few swastikas or 
other party emblems. But that's not the real prob/em. So forget 
about it/'8 
Mies had become very cavalier about the use of Nazisymbols. The 
deconstruction of a swastika in the plan of the Brussels Pavilion can 
be interpreted as Mies' attempt to work with the geometry of the 
swastika on a purely aesthetical level (Fig. 11 and 12). Mies 
transformed the swastika according to the rules of his own 
architectural principles. At the same time, Mies was trying to 
accommodate the taste of the Nazis. The very subtle use of the 
abstracted form could be interpreted as a hidden message to Hitler, 
a message that was to seal a silent .treaty" - from „architect to 
architect" - between the Fuhrerand Mies. lt is questionable whether 
Hitler (or anybody eise) understood this message due to the fact 
that it is hidden in abstraction. 
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12 German Pavilion Project, Analytical sketch 
of the floor plan, illustrating 
a deconstructed swastika 
11 German Pavilion Project, Plan 
Hitler judged the competition entries himself because of the political 
importance of the project. Elaine Hochman describes that Hitler 
reacted violently when he saw the projects. Sergius Ruegenberg , 
Mies' young assistant recalled that Hitler „sealed his decision with 
his foot"10 - he stepped on Mies' model. As a result, Hitler decided 
not to participate in the Brussels's Exposition because none of the 
designs satisfied his craving forthe new monumental expression of 
German power in architecture. lt must have been a greatsatisfaction 
for Hitler, an unsuccessful artisVarchitect himself, to be able to 
coopt one of the main figures of the Modern Movement to his 
symbolic and political agenda and then deliberately reject him. 
Likewise, Hitler's decision must have been a great disappointment 
to Mies. The fact that Mies compromised his beliefs for the taste 
and rules of the establishment made the disillusionment even more 
painful. Since 1925, when Mies was considered for the position of 
the chief municipal architect of Magdeburg, his willingness to 
compromise had overcome his streng architectural beliefs. This 
can be seen in the following paragraph, a letter by Mies to M.G. 
Fahrenholtz in 1925, rejecting the position offered to him: 
"' myse/f wou/d never have considered accepting such a position if 
1 were not anxious to prepare the grounds somewhere for a new 
attitude to building (Baugesinnung), since I can't imagine tor what 
other reason I should give up my artistically tree and materially far 
better position. Since / pursue very specific spiritual-political goals 
in my work, I don 't find it difficult to decide whether or not I can 
assume such a post. lt the possibility of achieving the goal of my 
work does not exist in such a position, then I must forego it; 
theretore .... "11 
Mies was deeply humiliated. His dream of convincing the Nazis that 
his style was the appropriate architectural expression of the new 
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Germany had been destroyed with the failure of the Brussels 
Pavilion. 
Standard historical accounts of Mies' work fall into two categories. 
The „white washers" ignore Mies' political compromise and the way 
it shaped the monumental and stern direction taken by his later 
works in the U.S.12 In contrast, the „political realists" acknowledge 
a not-so-heroic period in Mies' life, accept his political compromise, 
and choose to deal with it.13 
Kenneth Frampton exemplifies the .white-wash" approach in his 
book Modem Architecture: A Critical History. The book demonstrates 
an in-depth understanding of the relevant historical events, but 
Frampton avoided the question of whether it is important to evaluate 
architecture within a political setting (to look beyond an aesthetic 
level and to move beyond platonic purism) and thereby missed the 
crucial issue of the relation between a modern master and brute 
power. On the other hand, „political realists" discuss architecture 
as a profession, made up of a complex fabric that includes site, 
climate, place, insulation, function, any internal activity, as weil as 
platonic ideals and conceptual ideas. In 1964, at the Modern 
Architecture Symposium, Sibyl Maholy-Nagy's attacked Mies by 
calling him .a traitor to all of us." She despised the fact that Mies 
tried to play up to the National Socialists. 
Only by using a .political realist" lens can one perceive how Mies 
became a victim of the ruling power structure. Until 1930, it was 
acceptable for Mies to stay .apolitical" - during the Weimar Republic 
no political commitment was expected by the govemment. Therefore, 
Mies never feit the need to join any political party. But, Mies could 
only stay .apolitical" until the Nazis came to power. The National 
Socialist Party required - step by step - the political commitment of 
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every German (Aryan) citizen. Slowly, people were transformed 
into tools of the totalitarian system. 
Mies had two choices - either stay in Germany and play apart in the 
Nazi „game" or leave the country. He decided to stay and work 
within the political constraints, not passively, but actively: he joined 
a body called the Reichskulturkammer, which was established at 
the behest of the Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels, in 1933. 
Although the Reichskulturkammerimposed no stylistic restrictions 
upon its members, it required proof of „racial purity". Membership 
in the Reichskulturkammer was a prerequisite for the participation 
in the Brussels' Pavilion Competition. 14 
In February 1934 Mies was granted membership in the Reichsluft-
schutzbund, a Nazi-sponsored organization for home air defence. 
In August 1934, Mies applied for another membership, namely the 
National-Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (NSV). The NSV was a 
Nazi sponsored organization dedicated to the needs of the poor. In 
Elaine Hochman's opinion, it offered Mies an attractive and harmless 
way of declaring to the authorities that he supported, or at least did 
not reject, the regime.15 
In the early years of Nazi rule, many architects, including Mies, did 
not believe that the Nazis could hold on to their power for an 
extended period of time. Furthermore, Mies did not speak any 
foreign language and leaving Germany seemed to him as an 
unnecessary, presumptuous move. 
But the truth is, Mies made his plans on the basis of altogether other 
criteria. He tried to use the political and architectural ambiguity of 
the Naziagenda to his professional advantage. On one hand, Mies 
knew that the Nazis rejected modernism and the Bauhaus. On the 
other hand, he realized that the Nazis accepted modern architecture 
in industrial construction , where ideological demands were less 
important. The ambiguous architectural intentions of the Nazis left 
Mies with the dream that his new, more monumental architecture, 
which was competing with classical revivalism, would become the 
appropriate style for the German Reich. As a result , Mies declined 
the offer by the Mills College to become head of the architecture 
school in 1936, and one year later, he declined a similar offer by the 
Armour Institute of Chicago (now, lllinois Institute of Architecture) . 
lt was not until 1938, when Mies realized that his dreams were futile, 
that he accepted the offer by the Armour Institute and left for the 
United States. 
Whether or not Mies was a traitor, as Sibyl Maholy-Nagy called him, 
remains tobe seen. We can only argue that Mies worked under the 
Nazis in order to remain in his homeland as long as possible without 
jeopardizing his life. In my opinion, an important but unremarked 
motive for Mies' continual compromise in a situation he obviously 
did not relish was his hope that he might become a major architect 
in the Massive Berlin Renewal Program (begun in 1936) . 
Circumstantial evidence seems to back up this opinion because 
when Mies realized that the Nazis had no place for him in their future 
architectural plans (perhaps the summer of 1936), he left his native 
country with shattered hopes and dreams. 
Years after his arrival in the U.S., Mies was asked to take part in a 
Bauhaus exhibition (shown in the U.S.). He denied participation by 
saying that he „owed nothing to the Bauhaus." 1 believe that Mies 
must have feit uneasy about his German past. What other reason 
is there to not share his Bauhaus experience, an affiliation he 
seemed to have fought for so strenuously? 
As the architectural community comes to terms with Mies' past, so 
must historians come to terms with architectures „real history", a 
history that includes politics, -in the same way that Germ ans need 
to come to terms with their „real" history, a history that must include 
their Nazi past. In facing these truths perhaps more will be 
understood about the Modemist belief in pragmatism, power and 
the efficacy of moral trade-offs. Perhaps all ideologies would have 
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succumbed to Nazi power and the regime of fear, but some are 
more open to compromise than others, and the difference often 
concern general motives of fatalism , moral relativity and the duties 
of opposition. 
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